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Resumo 
 
 
Motivados pela atual crise económica Europeia e a necessidade imperativa de 
promover o investimento e o crescimento económico, nesta dissertação desenvolvemos 
um modelo de opções reais de modo a estudar decisões de investimento ótimas, tendo 
em consideração quer o ponto de vista das empresas, quer o do Governo. Apesar de o 
Governo poder aumentar o stock de capital público, dadas as atuais restrições de 
liquidez, poderá ser preferível subsidiar o investimento privado em vez de investir 
diretamente. Neste sentido, incorporamos o Governo no modelo base das opções reais, e 
usamos este modelo estendido para determinar o comportamento ótimo para as 
empresas e para o Governo, nas suas decisões de investimento e de promover o 
investimento, respetivamente. Para ser mais realista, o modelo inclui, não só as 
ineficiências (que afetam quer a implementação quer a gestão do projeto), mas também 
os benefícios económicos de investir, i.e., o efeito multiplicador do investimento na 
economia. Para uma melhor análise, estudamos a sensibilidade dos parâmetros-chave e 
definimos regiões para diferentes tipos de investimentos e também soluções 
alternativas.  
Entre as principais conclusões está o facto da probabilidade de ser ótimo para o 
Governo subsidiar o investimento privado em vez de investir diretamente ser tanto 
maior quanto maiores forem o efeito multiplicador do investimento privado, as taxas de 
imposto, o valor atual dos cash flows privados, o custo do investimento privado e, 
também, o nível de ineficiência do Governo. Calibrando o modelo para Portugal, 
concluímos que pode ser mais vantajoso para o Governo português subsidiar 
investimentos em infraestruturas e noutras áreas onde a sua ineficiência seja elevada, 
enquanto que pode ser mais vantajoso o investimento diretamente em áreas como a 
educação e a saúde. 
 
Palavras-chave: Finanças empresariais; Decisões de investimento; Política de 
financiamento; Política Orçamental; Modelo de Opções Reais; Portugal. 
 
Códigos de classificação JEL: E22; E62; G31; G32; H32.   
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Abstract 
 
 
Motivated by the current European economic crisis and the urgent need to 
promote investment and output growth, in this dissertation we develop a real options 
model in order to study optimal investment decisions, considering both the point of 
view of firms and Government. Although the Government can increase the public 
capital stock, given the current financial constraints, it may be preferable to subsidize 
private investment rather than investing directly. So, we incorporate the Government in 
the baseline real options model, and we use this extended model to drive the optimal 
behaviour for firms and Government on their decision to invest and promote 
investment, respectively. To be more realistic, the model takes in account, not only 
inefficiencies (both concerning the implementation and management of the project), but 
also the economic benefits of investing, i.e., the investment multiplier effect in the 
economy. For a better analysis, we study the sensitivity for the key parameters and 
define regions for different types of investment and consider alternative solutions too. 
Among the main conclusions we find that the probability of being optimal for 
the Government to subsidize private investment rather than investing directly is greater 
the larger the private investment multiplier effect, the tax rates, the private present value 
of the profit flows, the private cost of the investment and, also, the inefficiency level of 
the Government. By calibrating the model for Portugal, we have also concluded that it 
could be better for the Portuguese Government to subsidize the investments in 
infrastructure and in other sectors with a high level of public inefficiency, while it could 
be more advantageous for the Government to implement directly public investment in 
sectors as education and healthcare. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate finance; Fixed investment decisions; Financing policy; Fiscal 
policy; Real options model; Portugal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis and most recently the European sovereign-debt crisis 
have penalized the economic growth in Europe and particularly in Portugal. The 
beginning of the global financial crisis led the world economy to recession and created 
more difficult financing conditions for some countries. This increases the necessity of 
promoting economic growth, but the liquidity constraints for firms and Governments of 
some countries restricted that. In fact, for many years the Governments accumulated 
budget deficits and the public debt grew year after year. The existence of easy and 
accessible credit has also supported economic bubbles. 
 Actually, on the one hand the Governments needs to promote economic growth, 
but on the other hand the austerity policies implemented to try to reduce their deficits 
and debts are hindering the adoption of measures to promote economic growth. Beyond, 
the contractionary fiscal policies, the recession has also deepened because of the 
liquidity constraints in some countries.  With the lack of monetary resources, a high 
uncertainty and the austerity policies, the investment of firms and the consumption of 
the families have been deferred and, consequently, the economic recovery has also been 
delayed. This problem may assume a particular relevance in a situation of economic 
crisis. In fact, the investment is indispensable to the economic growth, either the public 
or the private, and if there is a private investment reduction, the Keynesian school 
defends an increase in the public investment in order to stimulate output. Nevertheless, 
the policy makers are actually mainly focused on the austerity measures over economic 
growth promotion, so it is important to find alternatives.  
Since one of the objectives of the Government is to preserve good economic 
performance, and one of the ways for achieve that is to encourage investment, in 
addition to increase their own investment or consumption, the public institution could 
try to improve firms’ conditions. This means that this problem can be minimized with 
some intervention of the Government. In some circumstances, for high value or very 
important projects, public incentives may hasten their implementation.  
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Even with few resources, the Government can promote investment by ensuring 
high levels of political and institutional indicators, which means low risk and 
uncertainty, or, if this is already achieved, by incentives policy. Instead of the traditional 
public investment, it is possible to encourage the private investment, namely by a 
subsidizing policy. This policy can represent a smaller financial effort for the 
Government and can bring the same payoff or even more, which means a higher capital 
rate of return.  
Inspired by the current European crisis, the main goal of this dissertation is to 
find how to promote investment, as we think that it has a crucial role on firms’ 
evolution and economic performance. In fact, our motivation is to find a possible 
solution to promote economic growth with few Government resources. However, in our 
approach we try to follow not only the firm point of view, but also the Government 
perspective. Accordingly, we try to obtain the optimal behaviour both for firms and 
Government by managing some key parameters to reduce the critical value and thus to 
hasten the private investment. Although we know that immediate exercise of the option 
to investment may not be optimal for individual project, we try to maximize aggregate 
welfare by promoting that investment. Therefore, during economic crisis it may be 
crucial to hasten the investment, because it's when it is more necessary.  
We will study the interaction between firms and Government in the context of 
investment decisions, taking a real options approach for studying how to promote 
investment, and therefore economic growth. Basically, we will look for what to do to 
make firms want to invest now, seeing also what can the Government do for that 
purpose. Moreover, we will explore some possible Government stimuli related to the 
promotion of private investment. 
By exploring the interaction between Government and firms, and the concerns of 
both, we develop a Real Options model which explores some key factors for decision-
making. The outcome will be a model that drives the optimal behaviour for firms and 
Government on their decision to invest and promote investment, respectively. To be 
more realistic, the model will take in account, not only inefficiencies (both concerning 
the implementation and management of the project), but also the economic benefits of 
investing, i.e., the investment multiplier effect in the economy. For a better analysis, we 
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study the sensitivity for the key parameters and define regions for different types of 
investment and consider alternative solutions too.  
Our main contribution to the literature is related to the introduction of some 
macroeconomic aspects into the investment decision process, namely the private and 
public investment multipliers, the efficiency degree of the agents (public and private) 
and taxes, in addition to the common aspects such as profit flows, uncertainty, risk-free 
rate and the cost of the investment. 
The model can be useful both for the private sector and for the policy maker. On 
the one hand, the private sector will know the conditions of negotiation with the 
Government, namely about the maximum subsidy that the policy maker is willing to 
give for each type of project. On the other hand, the Government will know the optimal 
values for firms and how to stimulate optimally the investment. 
This dissertation unfolds as follows. In chapter 2 we present the literature 
review. In chapter 3 we develop the model, presenting the value-functions and the 
triggers both for firms and for Government. The optimal incentives that prompt 
investment are derived. The chapter 4 contains some case-scenario and statics analysis. 
In chapter 5 we explore some alternative stimuli for investment and in chapter 6 we 
have an application of the model to Portugal. Finally, in chapter 7 we conclude. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
Traditionally, in the context of investment decisions, the Net Present Value 
(NPV) is the main criterion for project selection and valuation. Based on this method, 
the decision will be to invest if the NPV is positive. In other words, if the present value 
of cash flows is greater than the present value of the costs of the investment, the project 
should be implemented. This approach has some limitations because it is suitable for 
stable and predictable environments. In case of uncertainty, it considers the reversibility 
of the project, that means the possibility of recover all the cost of the investment and no 
existence of sunk costs, so, it assumes that there is no problem for the investor if things 
go wrong. On the other hand, it assumes that the project has no flexibility, so it is not 
possible to change or modify it and it has to be implemented now or it will never be. 
However, in most situations we don’t have these characteristics.  
In the presence of flexibility and uncertainty, the investment decision is different 
from the traditional approach. Even when the Net Present Value (NPV) is positive, 
firms may delay the projects implementation. This is because the project 
implementation is an option, and by investing now the company loses the option to 
invest later in the same project. Since the investment cost is mainly irreversible and 
considering that firms can wait for more information about the project, it is important 
for them to determine the optimal moment to invest. 
 Then, apart from the NPV, there is an option value for the project so, according 
to the real options theory, the total value is named as the value of the investment 
opportunity. That value can be divided in two components: its intrinsic value (the NPV) 
and the time value (the value of delaying the investment). Total investment value 
increases with NPV but the time value component decreases until it disappears. When 
the value of waiting is null, there is no reason to postpone the project implementation. 
When the NPV is positive and the time value has been depleted, that is the optimal 
timing to exercise the option to invest. 
As the profits flows are unknown, and there is a sunk cost of the investment, we 
can take advantage of the flexibility to modify the project and wait until the value of the 
opportunity of the investment is optimal. Thus, the NPV underestimates the value of the 
investment opportunity because it doesn’t take into account the option of waiting. 
5 
 
Accordingly, in our work, we make use of the Real Options Theory for a better 
approach, overcoming the limitations of the traditional rules. 
The expression «real options» was firstly used by Myers (1977) when he found 
that expansions and investment opportunities have, both, characteristics of an option. 
Later on, McDonald and Siegel (1986) have studied the optimal timing of investment 
considering irreversibility and explored the value of waiting to invest. Mainly, they 
show the existence of a certain optimal moment to invest which is when delaying the 
project doesn’t grant any value over the NPV. Furthermore, both Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) have expanded this methodology for many situations and 
applications.  
According to the real options literature, the optimal timing to invest is highly 
dependent on the uncertainty surrounding the project. Everything else kept equal, the 
higher the uncertainty, the higher will be the optimal trigger to invest. The economic 
intuition is that, under (high) uncertainty, the investor tends to postpone the investment 
decision, for instance, waiting for better information about market conditions, instead of 
investing as soon as the NPV is positive. Lee et al (2008) studied the value of real 
options investments under abnormal uncertainty, specially the case of Korean economic 
crisis. They show, the more flexible the investment project is, the more valuable it will 
be, so flexible projects like R&D accumulates more value under uncertainty than other 
investments such as advertising. Other important conclusion is about the size of firms, 
which is negatively correlated with the firm value because smaller firms could be more 
flexible and give a better response to uncertainty.  
Hassett and Metcalf (1999) have investigated if a random tax policy penalizes 
investment.  In a real options context, a higher uncertainty about the tax polity leads to a 
higher uncertainty of the project, which means a lower level of investment. 
Notwithstanding, the paper shows that if the tax policy follows a discrete jump process, 
such as the actual historical experience, a high uncertainty about the future tax rates 
may lead to more investment in the present. Specifying, if the present tax rates are in a 
low level, the firms will tend to invest now because they expect an increase in the future 
The impact of uncertainty on the investment depends on the stochastic process. The 
paper also concludes that there is a clear connection between uncertainty and tax 
revenues. Even under different approaches, they conclude that increasing the 
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uncertainty reduces the tax revenues for the Government. Finally, considering the 
impossibility for the Government to be permanently committed to a fixed tax rate, the 
uncertainty about the tax policy acts as an implicit subsidy to investment, which may or 
may not lead to an increase in the investment, depending on the approach.  
Böhm and Funke (2000) analyze the effects of uncertainty about future tax 
policy on irreversible investments and criticize those conclusions presented by Hasset 
and Metcalf (1999). They argue that investment is not much affected by the degree of 
tax policy uncertainty. In fact, changing tax policy uncertainty is not essential to 
promote investment even though the businessmen defend that tax policy uncertainty 
affects negatively the private investment. They show that the model presented by 
Hassett and Metcalf (1999) is not robust because of various assumptions. This means 
that a mean stationary tax policy uncertainty has no effects instead of encouraging the 
investment, as defended by Hassett and Metcalf (1999). Changing tax uncertainty has a 
reduced impact on private investment, and it is confirmed by Alvarez et al. (1998).  
Besides this, from a macroeconomic point of view, it makes sense that tax 
uncertainty constrains the investment, although reducing tax uncertainty may not be an 
important way of promoting investment.  
 The uncertainty of tax policy is only a small part of the whole uncertainty 
affecting the project. Knowing that uncertainty is a key aspect in the context of 
investment decisions, it is important to consider the specificities of each kind of 
projects, because different types of investments may have different volatilities (both in 
terms of levels and characteristics). 
Pennings (2000) has used this approach for study not only the taxation, but also 
stimulus to investment under uncertainty. The author, following the real options 
approach, proposes a way to determine the optimal levels of taxation, and subsidies for 
investments under uncertainty. Following the methodology presented by McDonald and 
Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the paper had developed a model that links 
subsidy and a tax policy. The objective is to find an optimal combination to promote the 
investment with a zero expected cost to the Government. Basically, the paper has shown 
that a lump-sum subsidy may reduce the time value of the opportunity to invest to zero, 
and so the expected waiting time to invest to zero too. Besides this, the link with a 
future profit tax policy may reduce the expected cost for the Government to zero. The 
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paper concludes that it is possible to stimulate the investment of firms with no expected 
costs for the Government.  
The subsidy reduces the cost of the investment and turns the implementation of 
the project more attractive, but the taxation reduces the profits. This ensures an expected 
zero cost for the Government, but also ensures the implementation of the project, 
because the ratio between the profits and the cost of the investment is higher than in the 
original situation, and ensures the expected rate of return of the optimal situation.  
Dapena (2005) has studied macroeconomic applications of real options. The 
main goal of that paper was to explore the impact of aggregate volatility in the 
investment, including the effects in the accumulation of capital and in economic growth, 
and the consequences in the development of capital markets and financial instruments. 
Some economic solutions to reduce volatility have also been studied. In this context, it 
is suggested that reducing the levels of indebtedness of the economy, increasing the 
levels of internal savings and reinforcing the equity instruments of financing leads to a 
reduction of volatility. The use of equity in financing the stock of capital is very 
important in the case of external financing, because equity instruments have normally a 
longer maturity and there is a risk sharing with external investors. The degree of 
development and the liquidity of the financial system have a negative correlation with 
the volatility. Finally, the author has articulated these conclusions with the evidence 
from some types of countries. Specifically, he has found that industrialized countries 
have a low level of growth and volatility, while many Latin-American countries also 
show low growth but with high volatility. The countries of Asia Pacific show high 
volatility but also high growth.  
With the exception of Latin-American countries, there is the positive expected 
relation between the volatility and the rate of return. This may be related with some 
specific conditions of the countries, but it is mainly related with the characteristics that 
we have mentioned previously, particularly a low development of financial markets and 
a scarcity in the use of equity instruments.  
 In addition to try to reduce uncertainty, one of the ways to stimulate the output 
is by promoting the investment. Economists commonly defend an increase in the public 
investment and consumption in bad economic times to promote output, specially when 
firms tend to delay projects’ implementation, which means less private investment and 
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worse economic performance. Leeper et al (2010) studied fiscal stimuli, namely the 
public investment effects on the short and on the long run, showing the particular 
importance on implementation delays. By referring that the public investment is often 
considered to promote output and reduce unemployment, the authors emphasize the 
critical importance of the productivity of public capital to determine those effects. The 
question is whether public investment actually stimulates output. 
Since Aschauer’s (1989a) seminal work on the productivity of public capital in 
the US economy, there has been a growing strand of the literature concerned in 
measuring the effects of public investment on aggregate economic activity. 1 One key 
issue in these studies is whether public investment crowds in or crowds out private 
investment. 
Aschauer (1989b) has found a clearly crowding in effect for the US economy, 
concluding that public and private investment are complementary. However, since then, 
the results presented in the literature are ambiguous. While empirical studies by 
Argimón et al (1997), Seitz (1994) and, for example, Pereira (2001) also support the 
existence of a crowding in effect of private investment, others conclude, either for the 
crowding out hypothesis (Voss (2002), Zou (2003)), or for mixed results (Afonso and 
St. Aubyn (2009; 2010)). 
This ambiguous relationship is usually justified by two opposing forces. On the 
one hand, public investment tends to increase the productivity of private factors, 
including fixed capital (Aschauer (1989a)). By increasing resources and infrastructures 
on the economy, costs for the private sector are reduced. On the other hand, by 
increasing demand for funds in the financial markets public investment causes an 
upward pressure in interest rates, discouraging private investment (Afonso and St. 
Tobin (2009)). There may be, also, a credit deviation from the private to the public 
sector, thus reducing the available credit for the private sector. Therefore, while 
productive public investment has a positive and significant impact on private investment 
and output, spending resources on unproductive investments could have a null or even a 
negative impact on the economy.2 
                                                 
1
 For comprehensive surveys on this empirical literature see, among others, Romp and de Haan (2007) 
and Pereira and Andraz (2010). 
2
 See, for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). 
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In fact, the impact of the investment on GDP, measured by the multiplier effect, 
is very useful to infer about the importance of stimulating the investment 
implementation. Despite the necessity of promoting investment, it is not easy to know 
which of the public or private investment is better. Erden and Holcombe (2006), 
considering that investment is important for economic growth, have studied the 
connections between public and private investment. They say: “Overall, the empirical 
evidence from the US and from developing countries suggests that private capital is 
more productive than public investment, and that although public investment 
contributes to the productivity of private capital, it does not explain the major part of 
the variation in output growth” (Erden and Holcombe (2006), pp. 479). Afonso and 
St.Aubyn (2009; 2010) studied the rates of return of public and private investment in 
seventeen countries, fourteen from the European Union (EU) and also USA, Canada 
and Japan, for the period 1960-2005. They found that the effects of impulses to public 
investment are never statistically significant at the 95 per cent level, while the impulses 
to private investment have mostly a positive and significant impact on output. 
Furthermore, the output elasticity of private investment is always positive and higher 
than the output elasticity of public investment. They also found that the impact of a 
unitary increase in investment on GDP is, on average, 0.73 and 1.47, respectively for 
public investment and private investment. This means that the private investment 
multiplier is twice as much of the public investment multiplier for this sample.  
Considering the importance of the investment in the economy, good 
coordination between firms and Government may be important. The interaction between 
the firms and the Government has been studied in various areas, namely in the context 
of investment decisions. There is some literature about the way the Government can 
control economic performance and evolution and also what to do in order to make firms 
want to invest immediately. Some authors tried to give an answer to these questions. 
Perotti (2004) studied the macroeconomic effects of different measures of fiscal 
policies, and has considered that the Government can stimulate the GDP by four ways: 
public consumption, public investment, transference to households or even by reducing 
taxes. This means that the Government has some different kinds of policies, but it is not 
easy to know which one is better, because the efficiency of the measures depends on 
some other factors. Notwithstanding, we will focus on the investment, as we think that it 
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is important both for firms evolution and for Government goals, and also because it is 
crucial for economic growth and development. In this context, the paper emphasizes 
that a low or even negative rate of return of the public investment is not always bad, 
because it is possible the existence of high social rates of return. This is because the 
public investment may have positive externalities not only in the private investment and 
in the economy, but also in the development of the country. However, it is important to 
keep the Government influence on a moderate level.  
Effectively, the action of the Government may have positive effects in the 
economy, but it depends critically on the quality of the Government spending. As we 
have seen before, only increasing the public investment may be, not only insufficient 
but also inefficient. Afonso et al. (2005) shows an international comparison of public 
sector efficiency. According to them, “Most studies conclude that public spending could 
be much smaller and more efficient than today. However, for this to happen, 
governments should adopt better institutions and should transfer many non-core 
activities to the private sector” (Afonso et al (2005), pp. 321). 
Specifically, using various indicators, they studied the public sector performance 
(PSP) which is measured by the results of public sector activities, and also the public 
sector efficiency (PSE) measured by comparing the results with the amount of resources 
used. They computed these indicators for twenty-three industrialized countries and 
concluded that the small governments, which spent less than forty percent of GDP, are 
more efficient than the others. This may denote that the Governments could be smaller 
is some countries. The exception is Luxembourg, that with a medium size government 
(spending between forty and fifty percent of GDP) has the best performance indicator.  
Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2009) have studied the quality of public 
investment across countries, by developing a growth model in order to study how the 
inefficiency and corruption of the public investment services affects the productivity of 
private capital, the specialization and the economic growth. Synthetically, the paper 
suggests that the economic growth resulting from public investment depends critically 
on the quality and efficiency of public capital. It also suggests that the quality of public 
institutions influences GDP more than the differences of capital across countries. This 
may represent that the efficiency of the public projects and investment is vital for the 
growth and evolution of the countries. They have also concluded that weak public 
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institutions decreases the productivity and efficiency of public investment and it results 
in lower rate of return of the private investment, less specialization and thus in lower 
economic growth. Nevertheless, public investment is sometimes crucial for the 
productivity of private capital and, consequently, for a good growth performance.  
Besides the quality of investment, other factors are also important for the 
investment decision. Since we look to how the Government can increase the investment, 
we have to identify political and economic instruments that fulfill their own objectives. 
Keeping political and economic stability and reducing institutional uncertainty will 
lower the volatility, but normally this is already reached in developed countries3. It is 
also possible for the public institution to increase the opportunity cost of defer the 
investment with regulations that increases firms competition.  On the other hand, in the 
context of a Monetary Union in Europe, the risk-free interest rate is given by European 
Central Bank, directly for the Banks and indirectly for companies, so it is not a 
Government business. Even so, the existence of other institutions or mechanisms such 
as the European Investment Bank (EIB) is in some situations important4. Finally, we 
can hasten the investment by decreasing the cost of the investment. Therefore this is 
possible by two ways: subsidize directly a percentage of the investment or indirectly via 
public investment that reduces the cost of the investment for firms, and here it is crucial 
a high quality of the investment to ensure the success of this measure. 
There is some literature about the effect of subsidies in the investment decisions. 
Pennings (2000) showed that the Government can hasten the investment decisions under 
uncertainty with a zero expected cost stimulus. Specifically, the author proposes that a 
subsidy policy can decrease the trigger value, until it equals the current level of the 
profit flows. This means that it will be optimal to invest now for the firms, so they will 
hasten the investment. At the same time, with a taxation of the profit flows of the 
project, the Government can recover the subsidy, so it is possible a zero expected cost. 
Nevertheless, some may criticize the fact that this policy lowers the value of the project 
and then the value of the firm. Maoz (2011) has shown this fact, but also that this 
program for stimulating the investment, in this conditions, instead of offered, has to be 
                                                 
3
 Although the political and economical stability may be achieved, the Government can reduce volatility 
by ensuring the number of users or revenues.  
4 In troubled times, it is common to exist a high difference between the risk-free interest rate for Banks 
and for companies. 
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enforced on firm because of the lost of value. This means that this program penalizes 
the firms that delay their investments.  
Although some may criticize that this is not optimal for the individual project 
because of the value reduction, we argue that it could be beneficial both for the firms 
and for the Government. In fact, even if the project has a lower value now, it can 
stimulate the economy and increase the value of other projects, thus there are positive 
externalities that maximize aggregate welfare and the selection of the best projects will 
maximize the issue with few resources. Even with this, the firms will take the same 
capital rate of return, because there is not only a profits reduction, but also a reduction 
of the cost of the investment supported by firms. Therefore, if firms were given the 
necessary stimuli and some incentives, they may decide to hasten the investments. The 
Government will take also a better condition inasmuch as there is an increase in taxes 
that will pay the subsidy cost and could be also an improvement in economic situation.  
The value added of this dissertation is the aggregated analysis, as we consider 
the perspective of firms and the perspective of the Government too. To understand how 
the Government can improve economic performance, increasing GDP through 
investment stimulus is particular interesting. In the next chapter we are going to develop 
the model and derive the equilibrium.  
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3. The model 
 
Consider the existence of a project or a group of important projects to the 
economy. This project can be implemented by the private sector or the public sector. 
However, as we have seen, the public investment can be more inefficient and have a 
less impact in the output, so the Government may have advantages in promoting the 
private investment. In the case of the private sector consider not optimal to implement 
the project at the present moment, and if the realization of the investment is of great 
importance to the economy, the public sector have two hypotheses: to implement the 
project instead of the private firms, or to change the investment conditions for the 
private sector in order to make the project more attractive, inducing the private sector to 
implement the investment immediately. 
We are going to study these three situations: private investment, public 
investment and private investment with subsidy, analyzing for each type of project 
which of the options is the most advantageous. When the implementation is optimal for 
the private companies, the private investment doesn´t need of the direct intervention of 
the Government. However, if this is not the case, the Government can invest directly in 
the project or, alternatively, encourage the privates to invest. Next we will approach the 
points of view of both of the sectors (public and private), determinate which is the most 
appropriated decision for each project and quantify the incentives needed for the 
investment decision. We do this by taking into account the (in)efficiencies and the 
impacts on the economy that results from each alternative. 
 
3.1. Firms motivation  
 
 
The firms seek for investment projects to create or expand supply, to improve 
their competitive situation or also to reduce their production costs. Beyond the position 
facing the competition and eventual market share objectives, one of the main benefits of 
the investment implementation to the firms relate to the value creation. In fact, the firms 
have interest to find the best investment projects in order to maximize the benefits 
extracted from those projects, namely it profits.  
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The implementation of positive NPV projects brings gains to the firm, but this is 
not enough to decide the immediate investment. A good example of this is the current 
economic conjuncture in many countries of EU. This happens because the negative 
economic conjuncture, besides the great uncertainty about the future evolution and 
eventual liquidity constraints, make firms delaying the projects while waiting for more 
information, with the objective of minimizing the risk. This highlights the NPV 
insufficiency in the value determination and the consequent importance of the timing of 
the investment decisions for a better evaluation. The real options method improves the 
analysis of this problem, by introducing a new component to the value determination. In 
fact, the real options allow to determinate the optimal timing to invest, i.e., identifies the 
trigger value (for which is optimal to invest). 
In order to analyze companies’ motivation for investment, we use the Real 
Options approach from Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Some key parameters of the model 
are the volatility of the profit flows (σ), the risk-free interest rate (), the cost of defer 
the investment (), the cost of the investment (), the present value of the pre-tax profit 
flows (V) and the trigger value of the investment (	∗). We assume that the present 
value of pre-tax profit flows (V) follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM): 
 dV = α	Vdt + σVdz     (3.1) 
 
Where α is the expect profit flows drift, σ is the expect volatility and dz the increment 
of the Wiener process.  
The value of the investment opportunity, F(V), according to the standard 
contingent claim analysis must satisfy the following differential equation5 : 
 σVF(V) + (r − δ)V	F(V) − rF(V) = 0					 	 			(3.2) 
 
The solution for F(V) must satisfy, also, the following boundary conditions: 	F(0) = 0	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.3) 
                                                 
5
 For further details please refer to Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
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F(V∗) = V∗ − I     (3.4) F(V∗) = 1	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.5) 
 
Where 	∗ and  represent the trigger value and the investment cost, respectively. 
The first condition says that the option to invest in projects that do not produce profit 
flows has no value. The second condition results from the notion that when the 
investment is optimal, there is no option value to defer. Thus, the value of the 
investment opportunity equals to NPV. Finally, the last one is the “smooth pasting 
condition”, that ensures the value function is continuously differentiable along V. To 
satisfy the first condition, the solution must be: 	
(	) = 		 	 	 	 	 	 (3.6) 
 
Where	 is a constant that must be determined and:  	
	 = − ( !")#$ +%&( !")#$ − ' +  #$    (3.7) 
 
Where r is the risk-free interest rate, δ the cost of defer the investment, σ	 is the profit 
flows volatility and β is a constant which depends from the previous parameters.  
With the second and the third conditions we can achieve the following results: 	
	∗ = !       (3.8) 
 
This represents that it will be optimal to invest only when the trigger value is large 
enough, specifically !	bigger than the cost of the investment.  
 Finally, the value of the investment opportunity, (	), will take the form: 
 
(	) = )(		 ∗ − ) * ++∗, -.		 < 	∗									 − 										-.		 ≥ 	∗ 1	 	 	 	 (3.9) 
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If 	 < 	∗, (	) is greater than NPV, which means that is not optimal to invest now. On 
the other hand, if 	 ≥ 	∗, (	) is equal to NPV and then will be optimal to invest. 
 In this approach, the investment decision takes the form of how it is optimal, that 
is when the cost of defer equals the option value of delay the investment and then there 
is no option value but just the NPV, instead of taking the form “now or never” as with 
NPV criterion. This is a dynamic criterion suitable for real investment decisions, thus 
we are going to introduce it to study the firms and the government investment decisions. 
 
 
3.2.  The inclusion of the Government  
 
The goals of firms are different from those of the Government, but both want to 
manage efficiently the resources in order to maximize their own objectives. The firms 
want to maximize profits with minimum resources, while the Government has two main 
objectives: to stabilize economic cycles and to promote economic growth, also with 
minimal resources. This means that to achieve objectives with a neutral or even positive 
impact in the present value of public deficit and debt. Generally, the Government can 
try to stimulate GDP by increasing public consumption, public investment or, transfers 
to the private sector or even by reducing taxes.  
Perotti (2004) considers that there is no evidence that public investment shocks 
are more effective than other alternatives, but productive investment can have greater 
impact in some cases. In fact, in some countries with current account imbalances, a 
higher available income can exacerbate the imbalances and have a reduced impact on 
GDP, while in others it can have positive effects. In addition, investment decisions are 
crucial for the evolution and growth of firms. Therefore, we are going to study the 
Government motivation to increase the investment, by analyzing the interaction 
between public and private investment in order to find which is better in an aggregated 
analysis.   
Basically, if we consider a list of projects that can be implemented in some 
economy, increasing the investment means to implement some of these projects. 
However, if for most of them it is optimal to delay the investment, the public authority 
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may intend to hasten some of those investments in order to improve economic situation. 
But how can they do it? In order to increase the aggregated investment, the Government 
can anticipate some of their projects to increase the investment now. This can be done, 
either by directly assuming the investments (public investment), or by promoting, for 
instance by subsidizing, the private investment. But is it efficient? In spite of returning a 
smaller profit value, the implementation of the investment opportunity now can bring a 
positive externality to the economy and improve the value of other projects too.  In fact, 
both the private sector and the Government can benefit with the existence of a subsidy. 
To the private firms, the investment gets optimal, whereas the Government can promote 
the economic growth, and increase the collected taxes, and this can be possible without 
deteriorating public finances. This way, there is a higher performance of the economy, 
because as more projects are implemented the better the economic situation and, as a 
consequence, other projects increase in value and are implemented sooner as well. 
Furthermore, it can be expected an increase in GDP and an unemployment reduction.  
This can be crucial if the Government is able to promote the implementation of 
the most productive projects, which allow the implementation of other type of projects, 
complementary to these, but more sophisticated. This represents an evolutionary 
process, as it potentiates economic growth and economic and social development. So it 
is decisive to implement distinguished projects with high economic value added. 
Instead of being only done by the Public Sector, the investment can also be made 
by private firms, which can do it naturally or by hastening the investment decision. In 
the first case it is not necessary much attention of the Government, but this is quite 
different in the second case. When the projects implemented normally by firms are 
sufficient, the economy grows naturally, but when this is not enough there must be 
some interference. In this case, if the public institution wants to increase the private 
investment in the economy, assuming that all institutional and political incentives are 
achieved, it implies to reduce the trigger value of the private investments, namely by 
subsidizing. Effectively, the firms must have incentives to implement the investment 
earlier, but the Government must also take some advantage on it. In some circumstances 
the Government may have advantage by investing itself, but in others it would be better 
to subsidize. In this sense, based on the real options model shown previously we are 
going to present a model to try to solve this questions.  
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Including the government, there are new parameters and new conclusions. There 
will be thus two trigger values: for government (	2∗) and for private firms (	3∗). There is 
also the multiplier of private investment (43) and of the public investment (42), which 
measures the impact of each kind of investment in the output. On the other hand, we 
also consider the existence of two tax rates: one over capital, the capital income tax rate (56), and another for the rest of the economy, the normal average tax rate of the 
economy (57). Beyond that we also consider the comparative inefficiency of public 
sector facing the private, both in the investment cost (89), and in the current value of the 
profits flows (8+).  This means that we will have two investment costs, for private (3) 
and for the Government (2), and also two present values of the profit flows, 
respectively 	3 and 	2.   In this stage we will consider that motivations of V:∗ and V;∗	are 
similar, because this kind of investment is not a public good. Nevertheless, the payoffs 
are different.  
With a normal private investment, 3, the firm’s payoff will be the pre-tax profit 
flows, 	3, deducted of the tax income (56), thus the net profit value is: 
 
 	3(1 − 56) − 3	 	 	 	 	 (3.10)	
 
With this investment, for the Government the payoffs are: 		 	3	56 + 57433 	 	 	 	 	 (3.11)	
 
Where 57 is the normal average tax rate of the economy and 43 is the private 
investment multiplier. We consider that the benefits of the investment are not only the 
profit flows, but also all the positive effects in the economy. With a project 
implementation, there is a purchase of goods from others companies, wages for the 
employers and a panoply of external services and all of them pay taxes, thus we 
consider a normal average tax that focus on this indirect effect. 
In the case of a public investment, 2, the payoffs for the Government are: 
 	2(1 −	56) − 2 + 	2	56+	57422 	 	 	 (3.12) 
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This means: 			2 − 2 + 57422 	 	 	 	 	 (3.13)	
 
Where 	2 is the pre-tax profit flows and 42 is the public investment multiplier. 
Notice that the capital income tax rate, 56, is a neutral parameter for the Government. 
We resume this in the following payoff matrix: 
 
 
Payoff Private investment Public investment 
For firm 	3(1 − 56) − 3 - 
   
For the Government 	3	56 + 57433  	2 − 2 + 57422 
    
Table 3. 1:  Payoff Matrix for firm and Government without subsidy 
 
The action of the Government reduces the payoff for firms, as a part of the profit 
flows takes a form of taxes. However, the public institution in addition to capture taxes 
directly from the profit flows of the investment, also receives taxes from the multiplier 
effect of the investment in the economy. Since the private investment is usually higher 
than the public investment multiplier (as we have seen in chapter 2, Afonso and St. 
Aubyn (2009) estimated a private multiplier that is, on average, twice as large as the 
public multiplier), it can be better for the Government to subsidize the private 
investment instead of directly implement some of the projects. 
About the question if the public investment pays for itself, Perotti (2004) argues 
that there is no strong evidence on it. However, Pennings (2000) have concluded that 
the Government could subsidize private investment with a zero expected cost. In short, 
stimulate the private investment is less costly (the subsidize is only a part of the 
investment instead of the total cost) to the Government, the multiplier effect in the 
economy may be higher, the private efficiency may be higher and it is possible to 
implement this policy with a zero expected cost to the Government.  
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3.3.  Performance and efficiency 
 
Some literature has shown that in some countries the cost of the investment and 
project managing leaded by the Government are inefficient. As we saw, in the presence 
of inefficiencies, public investment may be important only to some extent, that is, to 
ensure a sufficiently high productivity of private capital and basic needs. In fact, the 
institutions weakness and corruption can exacerbate the decreasing of marginal 
productivity of the investment and confine it to the vital functions. In this case, 
increasing public investment crowds-out private investment and decreases economic 
performance. Became of this, as the private one has a predominant role, the 
Government should transfer non-core activities to the private sector. However, if we 
have a better efficiency and quality of the public investment it can extends to other areas 
and increase the productivity of the economy, so it is a key factor to choose between 
public and private investment. Naturally, the decision will be different from country to 
country as it depends on the parameters.   
Accordingly, Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2009) consider that due to the 
political cycles, clientelism, voting behavior, corruption and mismanagement, in some 
countries the cost of the investment for the Government is bigger than the cost of the 
private investment and respectively, the present value of the profit flows are smaller. 
Afonso et al (2005) estimate values for two kinds of inefficiencies across countries (the 
public sector performance – PSP – and the public sector efficiency – PSE) concluding 
that some countries are less inefficient while others are more inefficient. Furthermore, 
we will consider an inefficiency parameter that could be 0 in some efficient countries or 
superior in inefficient countries, and we define  	2 and 2as: 
 	 	2 = (1 − 8+)	3,		 	 0 ≤ 8+ < 1	 	 	 	 (3.14)		2 = (1 + 89)3,  	89 ≥ 0	 	 	 	 (3.15) 
 
 Where 8+ represents the percentage of inefficiency of profit flows and 89 the 
percentage of inefficiency of the cost of the investment. On the one hand, the 
percentage of inefficiency of profit flows means that the management capacity of the 
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Government is usually worse than the management capacity of the private sector, thus 
the Government could have lower profit. On the other hand, the percentage of 
inefficiency of the cost of the investment means that the cost of implementing a project 
could be higher in the case of the public investment.  
 For certain levels of Government inefficiency it would be better a subsidy 
policy. In fact, if the public projects are not as efficient as the private ones and knowing 
that the cost of subsidizing is smaller than the cost of the investment, in some cases 
would be better the existence of private investment with Government aid. Under this 
point of view, the firms can hasten some of the better projects that have more 
profitability and more value added, leading to an output expansion and it is possible that 
it has a null or even positive impact in the present value of the public budget account. In 
this situation, the payoffs for firms are: 
 	 	3(1 − 56) − (3 − >)	 	 	 	 (3.16) 
 
 Where > is the total amount of subsidy for the project. The payoff for 
Government is: 
 
 	3	56 + 57433 − >	     (3.17) 
 
The payoff matrix is: 
 
Payoff Private investment Private with subsidy Public investment 
 
For firm 
 	3(1 − 56) − 3  	3(1 − 56) − (3 − >)  - 
    
For the Government 	3	56 + 57433  V?	t@ + tAλ?I? − s 	2 − 2 + 57422 
    
 
Table 3. 2:  Payoff Matrix for firm and Government with subsidy 
 
 In this way, we are going to define now the trigger values of the profit flows and 
then the value of the investment opportunity. The trigger value of the profit flows for 
the firms is given by: 
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	3∗ = (!)(!CD) E3 − >	F	 	 	 	 	 (3.18) 
 
 
And for the Government is given by: 
 	2∗ = ! E1 − 5742F	2	 	 	 	 	 (3.19) 
 
Thus, the value of the investment opportunity for firms is: 	
	E	3F = G[	3∗(1 − 56) − (3 − 	>)]	J+K+K∗L -.		3 < 	3∗						3(1 − 56) − (3 − 	>)									-.		3 ≥ 	3∗ 1	 	 	 (3.20) 
 
And for the Government is: 
 
	E	2F = G(	2∗	 − 2 + 57λNIN)	J+O+O∗L -.		2 < 	2∗						2 − 2 + 57λNIN								-.		2 ≥ 	2∗ 1	 	 	 	 (3.21) 
 
After determining the trigger values and the value of the investment opportunity for 
firms and for the Government, we can now study equilibrium solutions. 
  
3.4.  Equilibrium 
 
In this section, we are going to analyze the interaction between public and 
private investments. If it is necessary to promote the investment and if the natural 
private investment is insufficient, the Government can increase public investment or 
stimulate private investment, as we have seen before. The firms will only hasten the 
investment if it is optimal to do so and the public authority will only subsidize if it is 
better than implement public investment. The optimal subsidy for the firms,	>P3C,  is the 
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amount that turns the trigger value of the profit flows equal to its current value (	3∗ =	3) : 
 >P3C = 3 − 	3 (!)(!CD) 	 	 	 	 	 (3.22) 
 
On the other hand, as the Government will only subsidize if this decision is 
better than or, at least, equals the public investment decision, the maximum subsidy will 
be: 	>QáS = 56	3 + 57E433 − 422F − (	2 − 2)	 	 	 (3.23) 
 
Consequently the maximum subsidy depends positively on the direct taxes of the 
private investment, 56	3, negatively on the direct payoffs of the public investment(VN −I?). We will consider that depends positively also on the difference of indirect taxes, tAEλ?I? − λNINF,  because the private investment multiplier is usually higher than the 
public one,	λ? > λN. 
After introducing and explaining some Governments’ inefficiencies, we will 
analyze their options. The Government will only subsidize if the maximum amount they 
accept to give is not less than the optimal subsidy for firms: 
 		 >QáS ≥ >P3C	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.24)	
  
If it is inferior, then the public authority will not subsidize, since it will not 
prompt the investment for the private sector, and can realize the investment by itself or 
waiting for a better moment. In this way, there are three types of investment. The first is 
the normal private investment with zero subsidies, which has more value; the second is 
the private investment with subsidy policy; and the third type is the public investment. 
Higher volatility, U, higher cost of the investment, , higher risk-free interest rate or 
lower cost of defer the investment, , increases the value of profits for which is optimal 
to invest. This means that when the parameters vary in this way, ceteris paribus, we go 
from investment region of type one to investment region of type two and in some cases 
to region of type three.  
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 It is easy to understand that in the same circumstances the trigger value for the 
public investment, 	2∗, is smaller than that for the private sector, 	3∗, because the 
Government has more payoffs coming from the taxes. Nevertheless, with some different 
parameters it is possible to obtain a different solution. In fact, the optimal value for the 
public investment, 	2∗, is smaller than the optimal value for the private one, 	3∗, if: 
 	2∗ < 	3∗ 	⇔ 5742 > 1 − (!W)(!CD)(XYZ)	 	 	 	 (3.25) 
 
Where [  is the percentage of subsidy in the total investment. This means that 
the normal average tax rate in the economy multiplied by the public investment 
multiplier has to be higher than one minus the percentage of the investment paid by 
privates (1 − [), which is divided by the multiplication between the percentage of 
profit flows owned by privates (1 − 56) and the level of inefficiency of the public 
investment (1 + 89). 
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4. Simulation and Parameters sensitivity  
 
 
In this chapter we are going to exemplify the model and study the parameters 
sensitivity. We consider an investment opportunity with a present value below to the 
trigger value, so the optimal decision is to defer the project implementation. The basic 
case inputs are as follows. The cost of the investment, 3, to implement this project is 
100 monetary units (m.u.) and the present value of the profit flows, V?, is about 200. 
The risk-free interest rate (r) is 5%, the cost of defer the investment (δ) is 6% and the 
volatility (σ) is about 20%. We also consider that the capital income tax,	t@, and the 
normal average tax of the economy, tA, are both 25%. In other way, based on some 
literature as it was mentioned before, the private investment multiplier, λ?, is bigger 
than the public investment multiplier, λN, so we consider that they are 2 and 1, 
respectively. Relative to the inefficiency, we began with a percentage of inefficiency of 
profit flows (γ\)of 25% and a percentage of inefficiency of the cost of the investment (γ]) of 25% too, as we can see in the table 4.1. 
 
Inputs symbol value 
Private investment 3 100 
Inefficiency of the public 
investment  
89 ^. _` 
Public investment 2 a_` 
Private investment multiplier λ? 2 
Public investment multiplier λN 1 
Capital income tax t@ 0.25 
Normal average tax tA 0.25 
Risk-free interest rate r 0.05 
Dividend yield 
Volatility 
δ 
σ 
0.06 0.20 
Present value of private profit 
flows 
V?	  200 
Inefficiency of the public profit 
flows  
γ\ ^. _` 
Present value of public profit flows VN	  a`^ 
 
Table 4. 1 :  Inputs of the basic case example 
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With these inputs, the trigger value for the public investment, VN∗, is nearly 
156.25, while the trigger value for the private investment, 	3∗, is about 222.22. We can 
see this representation in the figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1 :  Value of the investment opportunity for Government and firms 
 
 
 
 In this example, private firms will not invest until the present value of the profit 
flows, 	3	, equals the trigger value, 	3∗. It is possible to decrease this trigger value by 
managing some key parameters, as we have seen before. However, even with these 
parameters the Government can promote this investment by a subsidy policy. Actually, 
the public institution intends to put  	3∗ equal to 	3	. The optimal subsidy in this case is 
10, which is inferior to the maximum subsidy (that is 43.75). So, with a subsidy 
percentage of 10% ([), the cost of the investment for firms turns to be 90 and the 
trigger value 	3∗ decreases to 200, as intended. This means that with a subsidy of 10 
m.u. the firms will hasten the project implementation and invest now. Table 4.2 show 
the results. 
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Outputs symbol case 2 
Maximum subsidy >eáf gh. i`	
Optimal subsidy >jk5 10	
Percentage of optimal subsidy Ψ 10%	
Private trigger value of profit flows 
• Without subsidy 
• With subsidy 
	k∗  	 222.22	200	
Public trigger value of profit flows 	n∗  156.25	
Value of the investment opportunity (	) 	
• For firm without subsidy 
(capital rate of return %)6 
• For firm with subsidy 
(capital rate of return %) 
• For Government 
(capital rate of return %) 
(	3) % (	3>) % (	2) % 
50	50%	60	66.67%	`p. _`	g`%	
Government’s subsidy payoff  (>) q^	
(capital rate of return %) % q^^%	
 
Table 4. 2 :  Results of the basic case example 
 
 
 On the other hand, the investment can be also implemented by the Government. 
In this case, as the percentage of inefficiency is 25% both for the cost of the investment, 
as for the present value of the profit flows, 2 is 125 and 	2	 is 150. The trigger value, 	2∗, 
is 156.25, so it is not yet optimal to invest. Thus, the Government must compare the 
payoffs to choose the best decision. The payoff of public investment is 56.25, the direct 
part results from the difference between 	2	 and 2, which is 25, and the indirect part 
results from 57422, which is 31.25. Notwithstanding, the payoff of subsidy policy is 
90, resulting from equation (3.17). So, in this circumstances, will be better from the 
public purse and for the economy subsidy the investment, because with fewer resources 
the output will be much superior. Considering the payoff for the firm, which is 50, the 
total profit flows of the project is 140 with an investment of 100, which compares with a 
total payoff of public investment of 56.25 with an investment of 125. This means that in 
some circumstances it is better to choose a subsidy policy. Furthermore, the capital rate 
of return for the Government of subsidizing is 900%, much higher than invest directly, 
                                                 
6
 We measure the “capital rate of return” as a ratio between NPV (	 − ) and the investment cost (). 
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45%. This means that with less resources the Government can have the same or even 
more payoff by subsidizing. 
 It is obvious that the result depends on the parameters, so we are going to 
analyze now the parameters sensitivity. 
 
 
Sensitivity of the percentage of inefficiency 
 
 
 
If we consider the same investment with a percentage of inefficiency of 0%, 
ceteris paribus, 	2∗ decreases to 125, as it is shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4. In this situation, 
the Government will never subsiding private investment based on budget account, as the 
optimal subsidy is higher than the maximum subsidy. Nevertheless, if the private 
investment multiplier is superior, the impact on GDP is also higher.  
 With a percentage of inefficiency of 50%, ceteris paribus, 	2∗ changes for 187.5. 
Thus, in spite of investing the Government will always opt to subsidize, ensuring that it 
is profitable for the Government.  
 
 
Inputs symbol case 1 case 2 case 3 
Private investment k 100 100 100 
Inefficiency of the public investment  8 ^ ^. _` ^. `^ 
Public investment n a^^ a_` a`^ 
Private investment multiplier λp 2 2 2 
Public investment multiplier λg 1 1 1 
Capital income tax tc 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Normal average tax tn 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Risk-free interest rate r 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Dividend yield 
Volatility 
δ σ 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 
Present value of private profit flows Vp	  200 200 200 
Inefficiency of the public profit flows  γV ^ ^. _` ^.50 
Present value of public profit flows Vg	  _^^ a`^ a^^ 
 
Table 4. 3 :  Inputs for inefficiency sensitivity analysis 
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And respectively, the outputs are: 
Outputs symbol case 1 case 2 case 3 
Maximum subsidy >eáf ^∗	 gh. i`	 aa_. `	
Optimal subsidy >jk5 10	 10	 10	
Percentage of optimal subsidy Ψ 10%	 10%	 10%	
Private trigger value of profit flows 
• Without subsidy 
• With subsidy 
	k∗  	 222.22	200	
	 222.22	200	
	 222.22	200	
Public trigger value of profit flows 	n∗  125	 156.25	 187.5	
Value of the investment opportunity (	) 	 	 	
• For firm without subsidy 
(capital rate of return %) 
• For firm with subsidy 
(capital rate of return %) 
• For Government 
(capital rate of return %) 
(	3) % (	3>) % (	2) % 
50	50%	−	−	a_`	a_`%	
50	50%	60	66.67%	`p. _`	g`%	
50	50%	60	66.67%	−a_. `^	−x. hh%	
Government’s subsidy payoff  (>) q^	 q^	 q^	
(capital rate of return %) % q^^%	 q^^%	 q^^%	
 
Table 4. 4 :  Results for inefficiency sensitivity analysis 
 
With these numerical examples we can confirm that the inefficiency has a great 
impact in the value of the public investment opportunity, (	2), and in the maximum 
subsidy that the Government intends to accept. Therefore, it is crucial for choose 
between investing and subsidize. The augmenting of the inefficiency increases 	2∗ and 
decreases the present value of the investment opportunity, which means a bigger  >QáS. 
In short, a bigger inefficiency leads to more subsidy policy instead of public investment.  
 
 
Sensitivity of the multipliers 
 
 The multipliers have a great impact in the Government parameters. As we can 
see in table 4.5, if there is no indirect impact on GDP (case 1) the trigger value for the 
public investment is higher than the base case situation, because there are no additional 
taxes. Increasing the public investment multiplier, λN, will reduce 	2∗ and increase (	2), so the investment will be implemented earlier. Ceteris paribus, this will also 
increase the public investment hypothesis. Contrariwise, increasing the private 
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investment multiplier, λ?, increases the payoff of the Government of subsidize and 
increases this hypothesis too.  
 
Inputs case 1 case 2 case 3 case4 Outputs case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 k 100 100 100 100 >eáf _`	 ax. i`	 gh. i`	 a_. `	8 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 >jk5 10	 10	 10	 10	n 125 125 125 125 Ψ 10%	 10%	 10%	 10%	λp ^ a _ _	 	k∗  
 
222.22	200	 222.22	200	 222.22	200	 222.22	200	λg ^ a a _	 	n∗  _^x. hh	 a`p. _`	 a`p. _`	 a^g. ai	tc 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (	3) 50	 50	 50	 50	tn 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 % 50%	 50%	 50%	 50%	 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 (	3>) 60	 60	 60	 60	δ σ 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 % (	2) 66.67%	_`	 66.67%	`p. _`	 66.67%	`p. _`	 66.67%	xi. ` Vp	  200 200 200 200 % _^% g`% g`% i^% γV 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (>) g^	 p`	 q^	 q^	Vg	  150 150 150 150 % g^^%	 p`^%	 q^^%	 q^^%	
 
Table 4. 5 :  Inputs and Results for sensitivity of multipliers 
 
 In short, with an improvement in λN the public investment becomes more 
favorable and, in other way, an improvement in λ? turns the subsidy policy more 
propitious. In addition, the multipliers have no impact on the trigger value of the private 
investment (	3∗). 
 
 
Sensitivity of tax rates 
 
 Assuming that there are no taxes, as in case 1 in table 4.6, the investment might 
be already implemented, because the trigger value for the private investment is below 
the present value. In case 2 the investment can be implemented now, as V?	 = 	3∗, but t@ 
must be 16,66%. If t@ rises to 25%, 	3∗ changes to 222.22 and it is necessary a subsidy 
of 10 to invest now. As we can see in the third part, only this tax rate has impact in the 
private investment decision. By the opposite, only tA has impact in the public 
investment decision. Nevertheless, both have impact on the subsidize decision.  
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Inputs c1 c2 c3 c4 Outputs case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 k 100 100 100 100 >eáf −	 −	 hi. g`	 gh. i`	8 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 >jk5 −	 0	 10	 10	n 125 125 125 125 Ψ −	 0%	 10%	 10%	λp 2 2 2 2 	k∗  
 
app. pi	−	 _^^	−	 222.22	200	 222.22	200	λg 1 1 1 1 	n∗  _^x. hh	 a`p. _`	 aih. i`	 a`p. _`	tc ^ ^. app^. _` ^. _` (	3) a^^∗	 pp. pp	 50	 50	tn ^ ^. _` ^. app	 ^. _` % a^^%∗	 pp. p%	 50%	 50%	r 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 (	3>) −	 −	 60	 60	δ σ 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 % (	2) −	_`	 −	`p. _`	 66.67%	g`. i`	 66.67%	`p. _`	Vp	  200 200 200 200 % _^% g`% hi% g`% γV 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (>) −	 −	 ih. _	 q^	Vg	  150 150 150 150 % −	 −	 ih_%	 q^^%	
 
Table 4. 6 :  Inputs and Results for sensitivity of tax rates 
 
 
It is obvious that higher tax rates leads to an increase in the profits of the 
Government and it improves their investment conditions. Nevertheless, increasing the 
capital income tax rate will reduce the payoff for firms, so they will delay the 
investment execution. This means that the Government must keep this tax rate in a 
moderate level. 
 
 
Sensitivity of the interest rate 
 
 
 Table 4.7 shows the influence of the interest rate in the investment decision. The 
interest rate affects almost all outputs. If interest rate passes from 5% to 3%, the firm 
will be able to invest now. By the opposite, if it changes to 7% the amount of subsidy 
necessary for hasten the investment will duplicate.  
 
 
 
32 
 
Inputs case 1 case 2 case 3 Outputs case 1 case 2 case 3 k 100 100 100 >eáf −	 43.75	 43.75	8 0.25 0.25 0.25 >jk5 −	 a^	 _^. ax	n 125 125 125 Ψ −	 a^%	 _^. ax%	λp 2 2 2 	k∗  
 
_^^	−	 ___. __	200	 _`^. ``	200	λg 1 1 1 	n∗  ag^. p_`	 a`p. _`	 aip. ai	tc 0.25 0.25 0.25 (	3) 50	 50	 50	tn 0.25 0.25 0.25 % 50%	 50%	 50%	r ^. ^h ^. ^` ^. ^i (	3>) −	 p^	 i^. ax	δ σ 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 % (	2) −	56.25	 pp. pi%	56.25	 xi. q_%	56.25	Vp	  200 200 200 % 45% 45% 45% γV 0.25 0.25 0.25 (>) −	 q^	 iq. x_	Vg	  150 150 150 % −	 q^^%	 hq`%	
 
Table 4. 7 :  Inputs and Results for sensitivity of the interest rate 
 
 Figure 4.2 below shows, in a descending order, the trigger value of the 
investment with taxes ({5|), without taxes	({), for the Government(}), with taxes 
and a subsidy of 50% ({>5|) and finally with taxes and a subsidy of 75% ({0.75>5|). 
As we can see, the rise of interest rate increases the trigger value both for public and for 
private investment. This means a delay in the investment projects, and so public 
authorities must ensure that the interest rate remains in low levels.  
 
 
Figure 4. 2 :  Evolution of the trigger value (VCrit) by changing the interest rate  
 
IPtc 
IP 
IG 
IPstc 
IP0.75stc 
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Sensitivity of the dividend yield 
 
Increasing the dividend yield, δ, represents a higher cost of delay the investment, 
which means that the investment will be implemented earlier. In table 4.8 we see that 
the reduction of δ to 4% triplicates the amount of subsidy needed for implement the 
investment now, >P3C, and an increase to 8% allows that the private investment is 
performed now without public intervention. 
 
Inputs case 1 case 2 case 3 Outputs case 1 case 2 case 3 k 100 100 100 >eáf 43.75	 43.75	 −	8 0.25 0.25 0.25 >jk5 31.05	 10	 −	n 125 125 125 Ψ 31.05%	 10%	 −	λp 2 2 2 	k∗  	k∗s _q^. ^`	200	 ___. __	200	 aq_. aq	−	λg 1 1 1 	n∗  _^h. q`	 a`p. _`	 ah`. ah	tc 0.25 0.25 0.25 (	3) 50	 50	 45.93	tn 0.25 0.25 0.25 % 50%	 50%	 44.14%	r 0.05 0.05 0.05 (	3>) 81.05	 60	 −	δ σ ^. ^g 0.20 ^. ^p 0.20 ^. ^x 0.20 % (	2) 117.54% `p. _`	 66.67%	`p. _`	 −	`p. _`	Vp	  200 200 200 % g`% g`% g`% γV 0.25 0.25 0.25 (>) px. q`	 q^	 −	Vg	  150 150 150 % ___%	 q^^%	 −	
 
 Table 4. 8 :  Inputs and Results for sensitivity of the dividend yield 
 
 Increasing the cost of delay the investment, δ, also increases the payoff for the 
Government of the private investment execution. From δ	 near to 8% it is not necessary 
a subsidizing policy and the maximum payoff for the Government is 100, that is when 	3∗ = 200 (without public intervention). In this case, without any intervention, the 
public institution obtains the maximum taxes, so this is an optimal hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, even with δ = 6% the payoff can reach 90 and a capital rate of return of 
900% (the investment is a subsidy of 10). Figure 4.3 shows the relation between the cost 
of delay the investment, δ, and the trigger value of the investment, Vcrit. It is evident 
that increasing this cost reduces the trigger value for all kind of investments. This 
graphic also shows, in a descending order, the trigger value of the investment with taxes 
34 
 
({5|), without taxes	({), for the Government(}), with taxes and a subsidy of 50%  
({>5|), and finally with taxes and a subsidy of 75% ({0.75>5|).  
 
 
Figure 4. 3 :  Evolution of the trigger value (VCrit) by changing the dividend yield 
 
Sensitivity of the volatility 
  
 
Inputs case 1 case 2 case 3 Outputs case 1 case 2 case 3 k 100 100 100 >eáf −	 43.75	 gh. i`	8 0.25 0.25 0.25 >jk5 −	 10	 32	n 125 125 125 Ψ −	 10%	 32%	λp 2 2 2 	k∗  
 
166.67	−	 222.22	200	 294.07	200	λg 1 1 1 	n∗  aai. aq	 a`p. _`	 _^p. ii	tc 0.25 0.25 0.25 (	3) 25	 50	 50	tn 0.25 0.25 0.25 % 25%	 50%	 50%	r 0.05 0.05 0.05 (	3>) −	 60	 82	δ σ 0.06 ^. a^ 0.06 ^. _^ 0.06 ^. h^ % (	2) −	56.25	 66.67%	56.25	 121%	56.25	Vp	  200 200 200 % 45% 45% 45% γV 0.25 0.25 0.25 (>) −	 q^	 px	Vg	  150 150 150 % −	 q^^%	 _ah%	
 
Table 4. 9 :  Inputs and Results for sensitivity of the volatility 
 
Testing volatility for 10%, 20% and 30%, we see in table 4.9 that, with other 
parameters constant, only for σ = 10% the investment is realized now. Effectively, the 
IPtc 
IP 
IG 
IPstc 
IP0.75stc 
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present value of the investment, V?	 , is equal to the trigger value,  V?∗,  only when the 
volatility is near to 16%.  
An increase in the volatility turns the trigger value of the investment higher, 
which means that the investment will be implemented later or the subsidy cost to invest 
now is higher. This way, the Government should ensure good economic, political and 
institutional indicators to minimize the volatility. 
 Figure 4.4 is interesting because it shows exactly the increase of the trigger 
value of the investment when there is an increase on the volatility, but mainly it shows 
that the increase of VCrit is higher with capital income tax rate (t@) and lower with 
subsidy, as we see, respectively, an higher slope on the first curve and a lower slope on 
the last curve. This is because, in a descending order, the first curve (IPtc) shows a 
situation where firms pay 100% of the cost of the investment and pay taxes too. The last 
two curves (IPstc and IP0.75stc) shows a situation where even paying taxes, firms only 
pay a part of the investment, because of the subsidizing policy. This way, as the 
investment of the firms is only a percentage of the total investment, they support only a 
part of the risk, which means a lower trigger value of the investment, because they will 
invest earlier.  
 
 Figure 4. 4 :  Evolution of the trigger value (VCrit) by changing the volatility 
 
Instead of the subsidizing policy, there is other ways to promote private 
investment. In the next chapter we will explore other solutions. 
IPtc 
IP 
IG 
IPstc 
IP0.75stc 
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5. Alternative stimulus 
 
 In addition to the cost of the investment, the sensitivity of other parameters is 
also important, so the Government must try to optimize all this parameters before 
introducing a subsidy policy, in order to use it only when it is crucial.  
By testing the parameters sensitivity we can see that the investment can be 
implemented now by many ways: if the capital tax is reduced to 16.67%; if the interest 
rate goes to 3%; if the dividend yield ups to near 8%; or if the volatility is reduced to 
about 16%. This means that instead of using a subsidy policy, the Government can use 
other solutions. 
 
Subsidy versus Tax policy 
 
One of the other solutions is the tax policy. Instead of using a subsidy policy, the 
Government can change the tax rates. Figure 5.1 shows a relation between the tax rate, t@, and the percentage of subsidy which ensures that the investment is implemented 
now. As we have seen before, with a zero subsidy, t@ must be nearly 16.67% to ensure 
the project execution. An increase in t@ turns the investment less desirable, so it is 
necessary a subsidy policy to encourage it.  Now, we need to understand if to hold the 
tax rate and to create a subsidy policy make sense or if it is advantageous manage the 
tax rate, t@. 
 
 
Figure 5. 1 :  Percentage of subsidy for each tax rate 
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As we know that for hasten the investment is necessary a subsidy of 10 m.u. or a 
reduction of the tax rate to nearly 16,67%, we will compare the payoff for the 
Government in both cases.  Using equation (3.17) we find easily that the payoff of 
subsidy is 90 and the payoff of the tax reduction is 83.33.  
Effectively, it is better to subsidy if the cost or the tax reduction is superior to the 
optimal subsidy: 
   	3E56 − 56	P3CF > >P3C    (5.1) 
 
Where 56 is the capital income tax of the economy and 56	P3C is the capital 
income tax that allows the execution of the investment now. If this happens it is better a 
subsidy policy. However, if the Government have few resources at this time, 
implementing a tax reduction for some project could be better.  
 
 
Subsidy versus interest rate 
 
 
Beyond the subsidy policy, other variables can influence the timing of the 
investment too. An interest rate reduction may influence firms to hasten the investment. 
Therefore, if there is an institutional cooperation, instead of the Government 
implementing a subsidy policy, the Central Bank can implement an interest rate 
reduction. Exemplifying, in this case a reduction of the interest rate to 3% is sufficient 
to hasten the investment without any other incentive. 
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Figure 5. 2 :  Regions for each type of investment by changing the interest rate 
 
Figure 5.2 shows a relation between the interest rate, , and the trigger value of 
the private investment, VCrit or 	3∗. Each region represents one type of investment. The 
inferior limit of region B (curve between region B and C) is the curve of the trigger 
value for the private investment for each value of the interest rate without taxes and 
subsidies. The regions above represents a zero subsidy and an increase in 56, while the 
regions below represents an increase in subsidy, which can be reconciled with the 
existence of the tax rate, 56, if the subsidy rate is above the tax rate.  
Effectively, on region A and B, respectively with and without capital income tax 
rate (56), the private investment can be implemented without any subsidize, provided 
that the present value, 	3, equals the trigger value of the investment opportunity, 	3∗. 
Thereby, with a tax rate of 25% and a subsidy rate of 50%, if it is optimal, the firms can 
invest both on region A and on region B and on region C. Nevertheless, if the subsidy 
rate ups to 75% firms can also invest on region D and if it goes to 95% firms can also 
invest on region E, but we know that they will invest only when the present value of the 
pre-taxes profit flows (	3) reaches the trigger value (	3∗) . However, to invest on region 
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F firms will need a subsidy rate higher than 95%. This means that the Government can 
increase the regions of the private investment by reducing tax rate or increasing subsidy. 
In this analysis we try to understand the different types of private investment, 
seeing how the trigger value varies, for each type, with interest rate changes. Keeping 
the present value of the profit flows, 	3, in 200, the investment will be implemented 
now only if the trigger value, 	3∗, do not exceed the present value, 	3, which means in 
the regions below or equal to the line (VCrit=200).  
With this parameters, with a tax rate of 25% and a subsidy of 0 (inferior limit of 
region A), firms will only invest if the interest rate does not exceed 3%. Without tax 
rate and subsidy (inferior limit of region B), firms will only invest if the interest rate 
does not exceed 8%. On region C, firms will invest until the interest rate equals 15%. 
On region D there is the possibility of investing until the interest rate is equal to 25%, 
but only on region E and F this is always possible, considering a maximum interest rate 
of 25%. 
Table 5.1 shows the conditions for the inferior and superior limits of each region 
and also some numerical values for the percentage of subsidy, [, and for the capital 
income tax rate, 56, which allows the existence of those limits. Choosing one region, on 
region C must be a combination of [ and 56 which ensure that (!W)(!CD) is 2/3 for the 
inferior limit and 1 for the superior limit. In this case, for example, the percentage of 
subsidy and the capital income tax rate could be, respectively, 50% and 25% for the 
inferior limit, but they have to be equal on the superior limit.  
 
Region A B C D E F 
Inferior limit       
•  
(1−[)(1−5|) 43 1 23 13 115 0 
• e.g. [ 0 0 0.5 0.75 0.95 1 
• e.g. 5| 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Critical Interest rate ^. ^h ^. ^x ^. a` − − − 
Superior limit       
•  
(1−[)(1−5|) ∞ 43 1 23 13 115 
• e.g. [ 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 0.95 
• e.g. 5| 1 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Critical Interest rate − ^. ^h ^. ^x ^. a` − − 
 
Table 5. 1 :  Limits and critical values for each region of interest rate 
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Table 5.1 also shows that increasing the interest rate leads to a high necessity of 
Government intervention to ensure the execution of the investment. This means that the 
Government must try all the solutions to keep the interest rate in low levels before 
subsidizing directly the investment. Considering the independence of the central bank, if 
the official interest rate of the economy is not sufficient, the Government must try some 
credit lines in good conditions for important projects. One of the ways, in the European 
Union, is the financing of the European Investment Bank. Nevertheless, the 
Government can create some specific credit lines too. The importance of this way is to 
ensure low interest rates for positive projects. 
 
Subsidy versus dividend yield 
 
 The dividend yield has a great impact on the investment decisions. Really, if the 
dividend yield goes from 6% to 7.4% it is sufficient to making firms want to invest 
now. This is the same effect that a subsidy rate of 10%, but without public direct 
intervention.  
 
Figure 5. 3 :  Regions for each type of investment by changing the dividend yield 
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Figure 5.3 contains a relation between the dividend yield, , and the trigger 
value of the investment, VCrit or 	3∗. We have here the same regions of the previous 
graphic, but in this case, increasing the dividend yield leads to a decrease on the trigger 
value. This is because it is more expensive to delay the investment due to the lost of 
profits that results from this action overtake their benefits.  
With a capital tax rate of 25% and without subsidy, the dividend yield must be at 
least 7.4% to ensure the execution of the private investment now, which means the part 
of region A below to 200. Nevertheless, without tax rate the dividend yield must be 
above 4,5% to ensure the investment execution, this means that in addition to the part of 
region A, the investment can be implemented in the part of region B below to 200 too. 
With a tax rate of 25% and a subsidy rate of 50%, the minimum dividend yield to 
ensure the implementation of the investment is 2,7%, that is the part of region C below 
the line 	3∗ = 	3. Increasing the ratio (!W)(!CD) leads to a low dividend yield needed to 
ensure the execution of the investment, so the regions where investment implementation 
is possible are going to enlarge until it achieves the entire region below 	3∗ = 200, 
when the dividend yield goes to 0.  
 
Region A B C D E F 
Inferior limit       
•  
(1−[)(1−5|) 43 1 23 13 115 0 
• e.g. [ 0 0 0.5 0.75 0.95 1 
• e.g. 5| 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Critical dividend yield ^. ^ig ^. ^g` ^. ^_i ^. ^ah − − 
Superior limit       
•  
(1−[)(1−5|) ∞ 43 1 23 13 115 
• e.g. [ 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 0.95 
• e.g. 5| 1 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Critical dividend yield − ^. ^ig ^.045 ^. ^27 ^. ^ah − 
 
Table 5. 2 :  Limits and critical values for each region of dividend yield 
 
In table 5.2 above, we can see that increasing the public contribution to the 
investment decreases the critical dividend yield needed for ensure the investment 
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execution. On the other hand, increasing the dividend yield allows to reduce the 
contribution of the Government for the investment. 
 
Subsidy versus volatility 
 
 The volatility is another parameter with a large impact on investment decisions. 
Similarly to the interest rate, decreasing the volatility to about 16% would allow the 
implementation of the investment, in substitution of the subsidy rate of 10%. 
 If we set the tax rate on 25%, the volatility must be below 16%. As in the 
analysis of the interest rate, this means that the part of region A below 	3∗ = 200 
ensures the investment implementation (Figure 5.4). Then, with a decrease of the ratio (!W)(!CD), the region where the investment can be implemented immediately expands, as in 
the interest rate example. 
 
Figure 5. 4 :  Regions for each type of investment by changing the volatility 
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 Table 5.3 shows that an increase on volatility turns the investment more 
dependent of the Government support.   
 
 
Region A B C D E F 
Inferior limit       
•  
(1−[)(1−5|) 43 1 23 13 115 0 
• e.g. [ 0 0 0.5 0.75 0.95 1 
• e.g. 5| 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Critical volatility ^. aph ^. _pg ^ − − − 
Superior limit       
•  
(1−[)(1−5|) ∞ 43 1 23 13 115 
• e.g. [ 0 0 0 0.5 0.75 0.95 
• e.g. 5| 1 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Critical volatility − ^. aph ^. _pg ^. a` − − 
 
Table 5. 3 :  Limits and critical values for each region of volatility 
 
 
If we consider regions bellow F, firms will require more than 100% of the cost 
of the investment or, in other way, current transfers for implementing the project. This 
is a situation of projects with higher risk and lower or even negative values. Normally, 
these kinds of projects are implemented by the Government because the objective is not 
the profits but other benefits for society.  
It is not easy to understand whither the Government can incentive private 
investment when the objective is not the profits. Really, in this case the Government 
must weigh some important variables as the social welfare. 
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6. An application of the model to Portugal 
 
6.1. Characterization of the economic context 
 
Since the global financial crisis and the global recession, the European 
economies have deepened into recession. However, since the beginning of the European 
sovereign-debt crisis in Greece the panorama has been a little bit different. While the 
peripheral countries fight against high and raising interest rates, the core European 
countries have achieved a reduction. In addition, some of the non-core countries have 
liquidity constraints, only attenuated with some intervention of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), although it may be insufficient. 
 In fact, the accumulation of high budget deficits and sovereign-debt made the 
austerity measures a necessity, and so the economic stimulus from the public actuation 
has been null since the beginning of austerity. This way, high public debt levels forbid 
the existence of an expansionary fiscal policy to promote economic growth and, more 
than this, the increase in the sovereign risk premium also increases the risk premium of 
the private sector. This results not only on high costs of indebtedness, but also on 
funding constraints. This may also increase uncertainty and volatility in the economy, 
which can exasperate the problem too. 
An increase on financing costs tends to reduce the consumption and the 
investment, deteriorating economic growth. However, that is not applicable to all the 
countries, affecting only some peripheral countries. A high difference in the tax rates of 
the Government and firms between the peripheral and the core European countries, as 
the liquidity constraints, may cause competitively problems. Concretely, sharing the 
same currency, it is not possible an exchange rate adjustment to keep the international 
parity conditions about inflation and interest rates. This way, if the differences on 
interest rates stay for a long time, this may cause divergence between countries and 
difficult the sustainability of the euro area. With all this, we can see now the lack of 
economic stimulus to promote economic growth and the sustainability of the euro area.  
In Portugal, a peripheral country, these problems are a reality. In order to 
minimize the negative impact of the financial crisis, in 2009, Portuguese Government 
has tried to improve economic situation by implementing some expansionary fiscal 
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policy measures. However, the increase in the interest rates and the deterioration of the 
financing conditions due to the accumulation of high budget deficits and an explosive 
debt growth, lead to an international aid necessity, which took place in 2011. Since 
then, the Government had started to implement austerity policies, either by increasing 
some tax rates, either by decreasing some public expenditures, including public 
investment. 
However, these measures are having a strong contractionary effect on output. 
Therefore, if, on the one hand we try to reduce the deficit by the decreasing expenditure 
and increasing taxes, on the other hand, the strong negative impact of these measures on 
the economy have caused a substantial reduction of the tax revenue. This way, we 
verify that the negative impact of these policies are not restricted just to the harmful 
effects on the economy but also have contributed to difficult the effectiveness of these 
measures on the budget balance. 
 
6.2. Measures to promote economic growth 
 
In this stage we have no doubt about the importance of the fiscal consolidation 
for the country stability and credibility, that have a great impact in the conditions of the 
country financing, but it is a fact that this measures have leading the economy to a deep 
recession, and worst, they could be not enough to reach the goals for which they have 
been implemented. 
 We know that high public debt levels prejudice economic growth, specifically 
because that means less monetary resources to the private sector and high interest rates. 
Nevertheless, in Portugal the economy was much dependent of public actuation, and 
there is a structural competitive problem on the last decade. The restrictive fiscal policy 
has exacerbated these problems, so not only the economy deep in the recession, but also 
there is a high deficit that results from a high break on the tax revenues. 
 We argue that this problem can only be solved with a structural change in the 
economy. The Government must reduces his influence on the economy and it is 
fundamental an efficient management of the resources, which means to substitute 
inefficient investments by high productivity ones. With this, it could be possible to 
improve economic situation, keeping the tax revenues on an important level, even with 
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a restrictive fiscal policy. This way, a dual policy is needed: on one hand a restrictive 
fiscal policy by reducing significantly the expenditures, mainly the eccentric ones in 
order to increase the efficiency of the public sector, which can increase the productivity 
and competitiveness of the economy; and on the other hand, it must be a clear policy 
that stimulates the private investment in highly productivity projects successfully, in 
order to promote the economic growth.    
To achieve the first objective, it is important the privatization of many inefficient 
companies that are not central on the Government activity, just like the transports, and a 
panoply of firms on sectors when the private investment predominates, because this will 
take extraordinary revenues and furthermore will eliminate the need of great transfers of 
public funds to them. This will also end with the accumulation of losses and excessive 
indebtedness that in limit have to be supported by the Government. Summarizing, this 
measure will result in very substantial efficiency gains, increasing of extraordinary 
revenues in the present and the elimination of huge burden to the Government. Also the 
reduction in many expenditures and excessive transfers, just like charges of the Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP), transfers to the sectors with reduced competition, and 
others, must be strongly reduced. The execution of this spending cuts must release funds 
not just to reduce the deficit, but especially to promote investments of high efficiency 
and productivity achieved by the firms, this due to the Government inefficiency.  
Thus, if in a first phase privatizations and substantial burden reductions with 
PPP and other expenditures are taken, the efficiency gains and the resources saved by 
these measures could be partially applied, in a second phase, in the promotion of the 
economic growth by stimuli the productive investments, preferentially directed to 
external markets of great potential, since there is a sharp break of the consumption in 
the domestic market and the external imbalances. However, these funds can be 
insufficient if we consider the high break on the tax revenues. It is here that arise the 
need of alternative financing sources, just like European Union funds to the promotion 
of essential investments and the European Investment Bank (EIB) loans to ensure the 
projects financing. It must also be captured the external investment, so that the liquidity 
constrains can be reduced. Considering the high shortage of resources, it is essential the 
investment in highly productive projects and these have to be selected in a descending 
order of importance and productivity. This must be one of the incentives to the 
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structural change that may occur progressively in economy, changing not only the 
economic efficiency in the resources management, but also the qualitative efficiency of 
institutions.   
Above all this, the success of these policies will depend on the reached 
efficiency gains, i.e., with the same resources, would be essential to allocate it to the 
promotion of high productive private investments, instead of allocating a very 
significant part to public investments and expenditures of reduced efficiency.  With this, 
we would verify a sharp reduction of the application of resources in very inefficient 
projects, and a sharp increasing in higher efficient projects. This would have a great and 
positive impact on the GDP, not just because of the efficiency reached by replacing 
some public inefficient projects by more efficient private ones, but also by the execution 
of new investments of high return. However, we cannot forget the need of ensure public 
investments in central areas and public goods, but with high efficiency criterions, so we 
can guarantee that the vital resources for the firms investments are ensured. For the 
private investment to exist, it is essential the existence of a good public investment in 
diverse areas. However, we cannot forget that the public expenses must not exceed 
certain limits to allow the high execution of private projects that stimulate the 
productivity and competitiveness of economy. 
 
 
6.3. Model inputs for Portugal 
 
Now we are going to explore inputs for Portugal to introduce into the model. 
First of all we will try to apply the model into individual projects, at the same molds of 
the theoretical application, but applying to the Portuguese concrete case. At a second 
phase, we will carry out a more elongated and embracing analysis, by applying a 
macroeconomic analysis to the model results. 
Following this, we will firstly study the Government performance before 
projects type, or for different types of sector. We will consider the cost of the private 
investment, I?, with a index base value 100.  
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Inefficiency 
 
We consider the public cost of the investment with an efficiency level between 0 
and 50%. Specifically in Portugal the cost of the investment for the Government is often 
above the projected cost.  
Afonso et al (2005) have studied the public sector performance and efficiency to 
diverse types of investment in many countries. The Public Sector Performance (PSP) 
was built using opportunity and standard Musgravian indicators, while the Public Sector 
Efficiency (PSE) it is obtained by dividing the PSP ratio by the expenses. They have 
considered opportunity indicators such as corruption, red tape, quality of judiciary and 
shadow economy to compute the administrative performance. For education 
performance they have considered secondary school enrolment and education 
achievement, using infant mortality and life expectancy for the health indicator. The 
public infrastructure performance was achieved by using quality of communication and 
transport infrastructure. Trough this approach they conclude that the performance of 
administration is 54%, for education is 94%, 90% for health and 75% for infrastructure. 
This means, for example for the infrastructure that the quality is 25% less than it could 
be.  
By analyzing the efficiency, we see that the public sector efficiency for 
administration is 57%, while for education is 98% and for health is 117%. For 
infrastructure is 57%, which means that the efficiency is 57% than what it could be to 
that level of expenses or, on another hand, the expenses could be lower by more than 
40% to reach the same performance.  
Through this analysis, we can verify that the inefficiency changes from sector to 
sector, so we must take into account a sectorial application. In this sense, we can accept 
a level of inefficiency of the cost of the investment that goes from 0% in healthcare to 
43% in infrastructures case. On the other side, since being the PSP a performance 
qualitative indicator, we will extrapolate the inefficiency level of the profit flows that 
varies from 6% in education to 46% in administration.  
“Following audits of five Public Works Developments, through direct State 
management, the Tribunal de Contas (hereinafter TC) has found a widespread 
phenomenon of serious cost slippage (between 25% and 295% above the ceiling rates 
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established by the contracts), and, cumulatively, significant deadline deviations 
(between 1.4 and 4.6 years more than expected for the conclusion of the works)” 
(Tribunal de Contas (2009)). The reports of Portuguese Tribunal de Contas also link to 
slippages on public works from 25% to 50% in investment cost and, which highlights 
the idea of Government inefficiency in public works investment. 
 
 
Investment multiplier 
 
By studying the investment multiplier we follow mainly Afonso and St.Aubyn 
(2009). They have computed long-run elasticities, marginal productivity and rates of 
return resulting from impulses on public or on private investment. We will use the 
public and the private marginal productivity of the total investment, which is an 
investment multiplier that takes into account the crowding-in and the crowding-out 
effects on the private or on the public investment, respectively. For Portugal, the 
investment multiplier resulting from an impulse on public investment is 0.835, while 
with an impulse on private investment the multiplier is 1.252.  
 
 
Tax rates 
 
Following Eurostat (2012), for Portugal, the tax rate on corporate income was 
29% in 2010. The implicit tax rate on consumption was 17.4%, while the implicit tax 
rate on labour was 23.4%.  
This way, we will consider that the capital income rate for Portugal is 29% and 
the average tax rate on the economy is 36.7%. We compute the average tax rate using 
the tax rate on consumption and on labour. Specially, the average tax rate is computed 
by sum the tax rate on labour with the tax rate on consumption net of labour tax, 
because the agents only can use on consumption the net income of labour7. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 That is 0.234 + 0.174	(1 − 0.234) 
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Interest rates 
 
Consulting the long-term interest rates of Germany on the ECB website,8 we 
concluded that the average of the year 2011 was 2.6%.  
 
6.4. Different Investment types 
 
In this chapter we are going to make an empirical application of the model to 
Portugal. Firstly, we will make a general application to the Portuguese economy, and 
then an application to projects type in different sectors. Finally, based on our results, we 
will try to make some economic policy recommendations to the fiscal authority. 
 
Generic application 
 
Making a generic application to the Portuguese economy, we will use the 
parameters that have been explained previously. For the inefficiency we take the 
minimum value from Tribunal de Contas (2009). We will also consider a volatility of 
15%, 20% or 25% with a dividend yield of 6% or 4%.  
 
Inputs symbol case 1 case 2 case 3 
Private investment 3 100 100 100 
Inefficiency of the public investment  89 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Public investment 2 125 125 125 
Private investment multiplier λ? 1.252 1.252 1.252 
Public investment multiplier λN 0.835 0.835 0.835 
Capital income tax t@ 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Normal average tax tA 0.367 0.367 0.367 
Risk-free interest rate r 0.026 0.026 0.026 
Dividend yield 
Volatility 
δ 
σ 
^. ^p ^. a` ^. ^p ^. _^ ^. ^p ^. _` 
Present value of private profit flows V?	  200 200 200 
Inefficiency of the public profit 
flows  
γ\ 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Present value of public profit flows VN	  150	 150	 150	
 
Table 6. 1 :  Inputs of the first generic application to Portugal 
                                                 
8
 Accessed in September 2012, 14th. 
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By using this, we can see that  
Outputs symbol case 1 case 2 case 3 
Maximum subsidy sá 40.64 40.64 40.64 
Optimal subsidy s? 0∗ 3.56 16.43 
Percentage of optimal subsidy Ψ 0% 3.56% 16.43% 
Private trigger value of profit flows 
• Without subsidy 
• With subsidy 
V?∗  180.7 − 
 207.4 200 
 239.3 200 
Public trigger value of profit flows VN∗ 111.2 127.65 147.3 
Value of the investment 
opportunity 
F(V)    
• For firm without subsidy 
(capital rate of return %) 
• For firm with subsidy 
(capital rate of return %) 
• For Government 
(capital rate of return %) 
F(V?) % F(V?s) % F(VN) % 
28.3 28.3% − − 63.31 50.6% 
42 42% 45.56 47.2% 63.31 50.6% 
50 50% 58.43 69.9% 63.31 50.6% 
Government’s subsidy payoff  F(s) − 100 87.52 
(capital rate of return %) % − 2823% 533% 
 
Table 6. 2 :  Results of the first generic application to Portugal 
 
With this generic application we show the existence of more than one optimal 
investment type for the same project. By increasing the volatility	(σ), we can see that in case one, firms want to invest even without any subsidy because 
the trigger value of the investment is already achieved. As the trigger value (V?∗) is near 
to 180 and the present value is above that (V?	 = 200), then it is optimal to invest.  
In the second and the third cases, it is not optimal to invest, since the trigger 
value is not reached. This may represent that firms will wait until that is achieved, so it 
is necessary some incentives to make firms to invest immediately. In these cases, we 
show that it is possible to stimulate advantageously investment both for the firms and 
for the Government. First, in the presence of Government inefficiency, a subsidy policy 
will allow firms to invest immediately with the optimal rate of return, as the optimal 
subsidy for firms is below the maximum subsidy that the Government might support on 
both cases. Second, it could provide a high payoff for the Government and also a higher 
rate of return, which means that the Government could reach more money with less 
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investment that is supported. Third, this will generate a better stimulus on the output 
because the private investment multiplier is higher than the public one.  
 Now, we will change the dividend yield to 4%, preserving all other parameters. 
 
Inputs symbol case 1 case 2 case 3 
Private investment 3 100 100 100 
Inefficiency of the public investment  89 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Public investment 2 125 125 125 
Private investment multiplier λ? 1.252 1.252 1.252 
Public investment multiplier λN 0.835 0.835 0.835 
Capital income tax t@ 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Normal average tax tA 0.367 0.367 0.367 
Risk-free interest rate r 0.026 0.026 0.026 
Dividend yield 
Volatility 
δ 
σ 
^. ^g ^. a` ^. ^g ^. _^ ^. ^g ^. _` 
Present value of private profit flows V?	  200 200 200 
Inefficiency of the public profit 
flows  
γ\ 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Present value of public profit flows VN	  150	 150	 150	
 
Table 6. 3 :  Inputs of the second generic application to Portugal 
And the results are: 
Outputs symbol case 1 case 2 case 3 
Maximum subsidy sá 40.64 40.64 40.64 
Optimal subsidy s? 5.15 20.5 33.19 
Percentage of optimal subsidy Ψ 5.15% 20.5% 33.19% 
Private trigger value of profit flows 
• Without subsidy 
• With subsidy 
V?∗  210.86 200 
 251.56 200 
 299.36 200 
Public trigger value of profit flows VN∗ 129.79 154.84 184.26 
Value of the investment 
opportunity 
F(V)    
• For firm without subsidy 
(capital rate of return %) 
• For firm with subsidy 
(capital rate of return %) 
• For Government 
(capital rate of return %) 
F(V?) % F(V?s) % F(VN) % 
42 42% 47.15 49.7% 63.31 50.6% 
42 42% 62.5 78.6% 63.31 50.6% 
42 42% 75.19 113% 63.31 50.6% 
Government’s subsidy payoff  F(s) 98.8 83.45 70.76 
(capital rate of return %) % 1919% 407% 213% 
 
Table 6. 4 :  Results of the second generic application to Portugal 
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From tables 6.3 and 6.4, we conclude that if we reduce the dividend yield (δ), 
which represents the cost of delay the investment, firms will not invest immediately in 
all cases. Concretely, one of the results of that reduction is an increase in the trigger 
values of the investment, i.e., for a given level of uncertainty, if the opportunity cost of 
delay is reduced, the investor will tend to defer the project implementation. As a 
consequence, a higher subsidy will be needed to prompt the investment. It is easy to 
understand that if there is a reduction in the costs of delay the investment, firms could 
wait more time to invest. The value of the investment opportunity for firms without 
subsidy does not change because it would be the value creation for firms if the 
investment was implemented at the present value (V?	 = 200), which means without 
take into account the trigger value. That would not be an optimal investment, so that is 
why the value of the investment opportunity with subsidy is always greater than or 
equal to those without subsidy.   
We see in both examples that an increase in volatility (σ) also difficults the 
investment implementation.  
 
 
Infrastructure sector 
 
Inputs case 1 case 2 case 3 Outputs case 1 case 2 case 3 3 100 100 100 >QáS 53.13 53.13 53.13 89 0.43 0.43 0.43 >P3C 20.5 3.56 16.43	2 143 143 143 Ψ 20.5% 3.56% 16.43%	
λ? 1.252 1.252 1.252 	3∗ 	3∗s _`a. `p 200 _^i. hi 200 _hq. h_ 200	
λN 0.835 0.835 0.835 	2∗ aii. ag agp. ^h apx. `a t@ 0.29 0.29 0.29 (	3) 42 42 42 tA 0.367 0.367 0.367 % 42% 42% 42% r 0.026 0.026 0.026 (	3>) 62.5 45.56 58.43 δ σ ^. ^g ^. _^ ^. ^p ^. _^ ^. ^p ^. _` % (	2) 78.6% `^. x_ 47.2% `^. x_ 69.9 `^. x_ V?	  200 200 200 % h`. `% h`. `% h`. `% 
γ\ 0.25 0.25 0.25 (>) xh. g` a^^ xi. `_	VN	  150 150 150 % g^i% _x_h% `hh	
 
Table 6. 5 :  Inputs and results of the application to the infrastructure sector 
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The investments in the infrastructure sector (table 6.5 above) are essential to the 
development of the country. By analyzing the Portuguese economy, we see that these 
investments might be implemented mainly by the private sector because of the high 
inefficiency of the public sector. Specifically, this means that it is better for the 
Government (and also for the output) a subsidize policy, as the payoff of subsidize, (>), is bigger than the payoff off the public investment, (	2).  
 
 
 
Education sector 
 
The investment in education sector (table 6.6 below) is very different from the 
previous. As the public inefficiency is very low, the Government would prefer to invest 
itself. We show that in these situations, the value of the investment opportunity of the 
public investment is higher than the value of the investment opportunity for the 
Government with the subsidize policy. It is interesting to see that the Government will 
require a compensation of 13.3% of the private investment to accept the private 
investment instead of the public one. Nevertheless, we underline that the rate of return 
of the subsidize policy is higher because it is not necessary so much public investment. 
 
Inputs case 1 case 2 case 3 Outputs case 1 case 2 case 3 3 100 100 100 >QáS −13.3 −13.3 −13.3 89 0.02 0.02 0.02 >P3C 20.5 3.56 16.43	2 102 102 102 Ψ 20.5% 3.56% 16.43%	
λ? 1.252 1.252 1.252 	3∗ 	3∗s _`a. `p 200 _^i. hi 200 _hq. h_ 200	
λN 0.835 0.835 0.835 	2∗ a_p. h` a^g. ap a_^. _ t@ 0.29 0.29 0.29 (	3) 42 42 42 tA 0.367 0.367 0.367 % 42% 42% 42% r 0.026 0.026 0.026 (	3>) 62.5 45.56 58.43	δ σ ^. ^g ^. _^ ^. ^p ^. _^ ^. ^p ^. _` % (	2) 78.6% aai. _p 47.2% aai. _p 69.9% aai. _p V?	  200 200 200 % aa`% aa`% aa`% 
γ\ 0.06 0.06 0.06 (>) xh. g` a^^ xi. `_	VN	  188 188 188 % g^i% _x_h% `hh%	
 
Table 6. 6 :  Inputs and results of the application to the education sector 
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Healthcare sector 
 
The main conclusions of the investment in healthcare (table 6.7 below) are 
similar to the investment in education. Basically, the Government may prefer to invest 
itself instead of subsidize the private investment. In fact, the Government will require a 
compensation of 6.7% of the cost of the investment to transfer the implementation of 
the project to the private sector. However, in these examples the private firms will not 
accept, so the Government will implement the projects through public investment. 
 
Inputs case 1 case 2 case 3 Outputs case 1 case 2 case 3 3 100 100 100 >QáS −6.7 −6.7 −6.7	89 0 0 0 >P3C 20.5 3.56 16.43 2 100 100 100 Ψ 20.5% 3.56% 16.43%	
λ? 1.252 1.252 1.252 	3∗ 	3∗s _q^. ^` 200 _^i. hi 200 _hq. h_ 200	
λN 0.835 0.835 0.835 	2∗ a_h. xi a^_. a_ aai. xg t@ 0.29 0.29 0.29 (	3) 42 42 42 tA 0.367 0.367 0.367 % 42% 42% 42% r 0.026 0.026 0.026 (	3>) 62.5 45.56 58.43	δ σ ^. ^g ^. _^ ^. ^p ^. _^ ^. ^p ^. _` % (	2) 78.6% 110.65 47.24% 110.65 69.9% 110.65 V?	  200 200 200 % 110.7% 110.7% 110.7% 
γ\ 0.10 0.10 0.10 (>) xh. g` a^^ xi. `_	VN	  180 180 180 % g^i% _x_h% `hh%	
 
Table 6. 7 :  Inputs and results of the application to the healthcare sector 
 
 
6.5. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
By applying the model to the Portuguese economy, we confirm the existence of 
high sensitivity of the parameters for the investment decision. This means that in the 
current context of economic crisis and high uncertainty, firms delay investments. This 
situation could reduce output and increase unemployment, so the Government must 
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stimulate the investment.  However the stimuli could be different from project to 
project. 
With this sectorial application we show that the decisions could be different for 
different types of investment and also for different parameters of the same investment. 
In addition to the common real options parameters, we show the importance of others 
too.  Specially, the inefficiency of the Government can change significantly the 
investment decision.  
Accordingly to the public sector inefficiency, we conclude that it is 
advantageous to the Government to subsidize some essential investments in 
infrastructure sector and possibly in productive sectors with high public levels of 
inefficiency. Notwithstanding, the results may suggest that the Government could have 
more benefits in implement the investments in education and healthcare sector. Even 
with this, it is very important to implement only projects of high productivity to ensure 
the effectiveness of these measures.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
In this dissertation we have studied the interaction between the firms and the 
Government in the context of investment decisions. Following a real options approach, 
the firms will only invest when the present value of the investment reach the trigger 
value. However, the introduction of the Government, trough the existence of taxes, 
increases the trigger value of the investment, so this difficult the investment 
implementation. Anyway, in this dissertation we show that the Government can 
promote investment by many ways. 
In fact, in this dissertation we have shown that the Government, even though 
looking to achieve their own objectives, can have also a very important role in the 
promotion of the private investment, particularly in what matters to their instant 
execution. Concretely, in the same way of Pennings (2000), we have shown that firms 
would like to invest immediately if there is a certain amount of subsidy which reduces 
the trigger value of the investment to the present value of the investment. 
Notwithstanding, we focused on both perspectives, so it is possible to hasten the 
investment if both conditions are achieved: if the subsidy is sufficiently high for making 
firms want to invest and also if it is sufficiently low to be supported by the Government.        
In short, if the optimal subsidy for firms is lower than the maximum one for the public 
authority. At this point, based on Afonso et al. (2005) and Chakraborty and Dabla-
Norris (2009), we have studied the Government inefficiency hypothesis, and we have 
identified a direct relation between the level of inefficiency and the maximum subsidy 
that they may sustain. This is because inefficiency decreases their payoffs and so it 
makes the subsidy policy more attractive. 
 In this sense, when the Government wants to promote economic growth and in 
the presence of inefficiency, it may be better to subsidy firms instead of invest by itself. 
This solution can have a great impact on GDP, not only in the short-run because of the 
investment increasing, but also in the long-run because the substitution of some 
inefficient public investment by more productive private investment makes the 
economy more efficient and productive and it may results in a high level of GDP. For 
this to happen, it is crucial the selection of key sectors and the choice of the best 
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projects. To keep the efficiency in a high level it is determinative to continue by 
selecting the most productive investments. This brings a higher multiplier effect of the 
investment and so a higher GDP and high payoffs for the Government. 
Notwithstanding, it is also crucial the existence of a basic stock of good public 
investment, implemented directly by the Government or indirectly via subsidy. This 
ensures the existence of suitable conditions for the private investment implementation.  
By exploring the main parameters, we have shown that they have a great impact 
in investment decisions. This way, one of the worries of the Government must be to 
ensure low volatility and low interest rates, but also to keep the capital income tax rates 
in low levels.  Nevertheless, we have found no evidence that reducing the tax rate is 
better than the subsidize policy. This could be possible for the Government if the 
reduction was temporary, which have a lower positive effect in the investment decisions 
of the private sector.  
We applied also this model to the Portuguese economy. Mainly, we have 
concluded that the Government could take advantage from subsidize the private 
investment in sectors where the public investment is more inefficient just like the 
infrastructure sector. By the opposite, it could be more profitable for the Government to 
invest directly in educational and healthcare sectors rather than subsidize the private 
firms.  
However, it would be interesting to analyze more extensively the results from 
investment in other sectors, namely where there is the presence of the public sector. 
Moreover, it would be also interesting studying the implementation of the projects with 
more detail, namely by geographic regions or size of the projects and of the firms, 
which could lead to other interesting recommendations for policy makers.   
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